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A Child’s Right to Counsel:
The Case for Indiana to Craft Its Own Framework
Katherine Meger Kelsey, J.D.
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, a lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana seeking a mandatory right to counsel for children in
Child in Need of Services (CHINS) cases. 1 Appointments of counsel for children in
Indiana are discretionary in CHINS cases; 2 the lawsuit alleged that the failure to
routinely supply counsel to children in dependency proceedings, which includes both
CHINS and termination of the parent-child relationship (TPR) cases, was a
violation of children’s due process rights, as well as their rights to equal protection
under the law. 3 The case was dismissed in March 2020, with the court finding that
the lawsuit would be more properly filed in state court: the court opined that “[t]he
better path—since Indiana courts are competent to adjudicate these federal
constitutional claims—is to leave the integrated CHINS framework to the Indiana
courts.” 4
The status of a child’s right to counsel remains unresolved after the initial
dismissal of the lawsuit. It is a question that has weighed on the minds of attorneys
and child advocacy providers within juvenile law for many years. The 2019 lawsuit
was not wholly unexpected, as many states across the United States have taken
proactive steps to pass legislation providing a right to counsel for children. 5 States
that have not passed legislation for a right to counsel have been ripe pickings for
lawsuits, and several states have had a child’s right to counsel imposed upon them
by litigation. 6 With no robust mandatory right to counsel and consistently low
rankings for children’s legal protections in child welfare cases, Indiana has long
been considered low-hanging fruit for right-to-counsel lawsuits. 7 The idea of the
right to counsel for children in CHINS and TPR proceedings in Indiana has been
discussed ad nauseum by practitioners in the juvenile law community, with the
1
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4

5

6

7

See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Nicole K. ex rel. Linda R. v. Marion Cty.,
Case 3:19-cv-00025 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 6, 2019).
IND. CODE § 31-32-4-2(b) (2020).
See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, at 2, 8, 12, 21, 27–29.
Nicole K. ex rel. Linda R. v. Stigdon, No. 1:19-cv-01521-JPH-MJD, 2020 WL 1042619, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
3, 2020). A notice of appeal was filed. Nicole K., 2020 WL 1042619, appeal docketed, No. 20-1525 (7th Cir.
Apr. 1, 2020).
See generally NOY DAVIS, AMY HARFELD & ELISA WEICHEL, A CHILD’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN (4th ed. 2019),
http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/RTC4.pdf (grading states across the country based on their ability to
provide legal representation to children).
A more recent lawsuit is found in Indiana in Nicole K., 2020 WL 1042619, at *1. See also Kenny A. ex rel.
Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2005); In re Dependency of MSR, 271 P.3d 234 (Wash.
2012); In re Dependency of M.C.D.P., 174 Wash. App 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (en banc).
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 74–75.

168

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

[9:167

ultimate uneasy result of resting on Indiana’s current provisions of Guardian ad
Litem (GAL) and Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) laws, as well as its
discretionary provision of counsel enshrined in the Indiana Code. 8
With appointments of CASAs and GALs providing a temporary reprieve, the
question of what actions Indiana should take regarding children’s right to counsel
looms large before it. Should Indiana legislate a right to counsel, either unfettered
or with restrictions and conditions, or should it continue to support its robust GAL
and CASA network, alongside the discretionary right to counsel for children? The
Southern District of Indiana proposed one solution: a right to counsel for children in
Indiana is best left to the Indiana courts. 9 However, deferring to the Indiana courts
has its drawbacks; new law brought about by litigation is often impeded by the facts
of the case rather than crafted as a broad, careful consideration of as many factors
and circumstances as possible. Indeed, Indiana appellate courts have often said
themselves that they prefer not to create new rights via appellate opinions and
prefer to leave policy and law creation to the actual legislative bodies. 10
Indiana seems to prefer to craft its own framework for a right to counsel for
children in CHINS and TPR cases via legislation rather than having such a right
imposed by a court. Legislation will presumably provide more opportunities for
consideration, input from stakeholders, and ways to integrate a right to counsel for
children into Indiana’s already existing juvenile dependency system, which is
heavily supported by robust GAL and CASA programs.
This Article will first address the roots of the national movement supporting
the right to counsel for children and the underlying rights and interests at stake,
then analyze the various models used for providing lawyers to children, along with
ethical implications and concerns. This Article will then turn to Indiana’s laws, with
discussions of the rights afforded to adult parties and children in juvenile
dependency cases, how those rights and disparities between them leads to a need
for a right to counsel for children, and how Indiana uses the GAL and CASA
systems to remedy those disparities. Lastly, this Article proposes a hybrid system
where Indiana continues to heavily utilize the existing, robust GAL and CASA
systems in conjunction with a carefully crafted right to counsel for children in
various circumstances.

8
9
10

IND. CODE §§ 31-32-4-2(b), 31-34-10-3 (2020).
Nicole K., 2020 WL 1042619, at *4.
Calvin v. State, 87 N.E.3d 474, 478 (Ind. 2017) (“The [Indiana] Constitution empowers the legislative
branch to make law; the judicial branch to decide cases.” (quoting City of Lawrence Utils. Serv. Bd. v.
Curry, 68 N.E.3d 581, 587 (Ind. 2017))); In re Guardianship of Robbins, 107 N.E.3d 1080 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018) (“[P]ublic policy is ‘exclusively for the [Indiana] General Assembly’ and ‘the wisdom or desirability of
particular legislation is not a matter for the judiciary to determine’ . . . . ‘[U]nder [the Indiana] system of
limited government, the legislative branch is entrusted with decisions of public policy.’” (first quoting
Hoagland v. Franklin Twp. Cty. Sch. Corp., 27 N.E.3d 737, 749 (Ind. 2015); then quoting S. Shore Baseball,
LLC v. DeJesus, 11 N.E.3d 903, 909 (Ind. 2014))).
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I. NATIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL MOVEMENT
In order to understand the importance of crafting right-to-counsel laws for
children in Indiana, it is necessary to examine the underlying rights and arguments
advanced by the national right-to-counsel movement. These arguments are centered
in federal constitutional rights, and these rights are shaped by case law from the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Gideon v. Wainwright began the movement by establishing a right to counsel
for adult, indigent criminal defendants. 11 The national right-to-counsel-for-children
movement has its own origins in In re Gault, a case involving a fifteen-year-old
accused and eventually convicted of making obscene phone calls. 12 After several
years of due process violations, the child was sentenced to six years confinement for
making calls that were characterized as being of the “irritatingly offensive,
adolescent, sex variety.” 13 Emphasizing the importance of due process, the Court
noted that if the child had been eighteen at the time of his arrest, he would have
been afforded counsel and that provision of counsel would have effectively and
adequately protected his due process rights. 14 The Supreme Court ultimately
concluded that juveniles facing an adjudication of delinquency and incarceration are
entitled to certain procedural safeguards under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 15
Gideon and Gault provide that a person’s liberty is a fundamental right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and furthermore, that juveniles are
entitled to legal representation when their right to liberty is in jeopardy. 16 The
national right-to-counsel movement bases its case on these principles and advances
the argument that the logic in Gault applies equally to child welfare cases. If
incarceration is a threat to a child’s liberty interests, then the possibility of a state
removing a child from their home and family unit is also a threat to a child’s liberty
interests. 17 By taking a person into its custody and holding that person there, a
state creates a “special relationship” with that person, and that special relationship
requires a state to protect that person from harm. 18 A state that assumes the
responsibility of removing children and keeping them in a safe environment also
imposes upon itself an obligation to ensure the continuing safety of that
environment, and the failure to meet that obligation constitutes a deprivation of
11

12
13
14
15
16
17

18

372 U.S. 335, 343–44 (1963) (holding, for the first time, that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the
Sixth Amendment right to representation for indigent criminal defendants to have legal representation at
the state level).
387 U.S. 1, 4–5, 8 (1967).
Id. at 29.
Id.
Id. at 41, 49.
Id.; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343–44.
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 9; see Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Appellant, In re Dependency of M.C.D.P., 174 Wash. App 1029 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (No. 68401-9-I); see
also Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1360–61 (N.D. Ga. 2005).
Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 855–56 (5th Cir. 2012).
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liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. 19 Right-to-counsel advocates assert that
this situation places the child’s liberty interests at stake, thus requiring
appointment of counsel. 20
A federal court adopted this line of reasoning in Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v.
Perdue. 21 In Kenny A., the court found that under Georgia state law, “children have
fundamental liberty interests at stake in deprivation and TPR proceedings . . .
includ[ing] a child's interest in his or her own safety, health, and well-being, as well
as an interest in maintaining the integrity of the family unit.” 22 In its reasoning,
the court discussed how a child’s fundamental liberty interests were at stake in a
manner that necessitated an attorney. 23 The threat of being removed from their
family constituted a threat to the child’s fundamental liberty interests; even after a
removal, the child’s liberty interests were still threatened and the removal itself
had created a special relationship between the State and the child that gave “rise to
rights to reasonably safe living conditions and services necessary to ensure
protection from physical, psychological, and emotional harm.” 24
While Kenny A. was predicated upon a termination of parental rights, the
recent Indiana lawsuit and national right-to-counsel-for-children advocates argue
that the Kenny A. decision applies equally to all child welfare/dependency
proceedings, which in Indiana would be CHINS proceedings. 25 Children who are
subject to these proceedings can remain in state custody for as many as eighteen
years, can be removed from their homes, and can be transferred from placement to
placement without notice or consent. 26 Furthermore, CHINS proceedings can and
often do result in a permanency plan leading to the termination of parental rights. 27
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990). For an Indiana case addressing this concept, see
Y.A. ex rel. Fleener v. Bayh, 657 N.E.2d 410, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a child in the custody of
state officials has the constitutional right to be free from abuse or neglect, but this right did not include the
right to a specific residential placement).
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 8–12.
356 F. Supp. 2d at 1360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN DEPENDENCY CASES (2017),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.naccchildlaw.org/resource/resmgr/infographic/nacc-infographic.pdf.
See Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 1. The Complaint alleges that
when the government engages in the “traumatic” removal of a child from their home, the government must
then go on to protect the child’s legal rights and liberty interests. Id.
Those rights include the right to be represented by an attorney when the child’s fundamental
liberty interests are at stake. Such liberty interests center on whether the child will be placed
in state custody through foster care and include where the child will live, with whom the child
will live, and whether the integrity of family relationships will be maintained or dissolved —
issues at the very core of child dependency proceedings that are adjudicated following
substantiated allegations of abuse or neglect. The juvenile dependency court is charged with
making decisions about these and other aspects of the child’s living situation, decisions that
will potentially impact the child for the rest of his or her life.

27

Id. at 1.
NAT’L ASS’N OF COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN, supra note 25.
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The stakes for children in child welfare cases are just as significant as they
are for parents and other family members. 28 Indiana CHINS and TPR cases
reference the fundamental nature of the parental rights at stake and how CHINS
and TPR proceedings have the ability to interfere with those fundamental rights. 29
Similarly, a child’s family can be changed forever by CHINS and TPR cases:
children are subject to court decisions about their own lives and families; children’s
ties to their heritage, history, and culture may be at risk of being altered; and
children’s right to family integrity is at play. 30 Numerous studies point out that
children involved in a state’s child welfare system experience uncertainty and
ambiguity, and this uncertainty results in a significant amount of trauma to young
children. 31 Because a child is a party to a case and their liberties and liabilities are
just as much at risk as the other parties, the right to counsel movement insists that
due process rights should apply to children as well.
II. MODELS OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Thirty-four states in the United States have an explicit right to counsel for
children in abuse and neglect proceedings; however, among states that provide a
right to counsel for children, only fifteen of those states require the counsel for
children to be client directed in all reasonable circumstances. 32 States that grant
some type of right to counsel often place restrictions or conditions on that right,
regardless of whether the offered counsel is structured within a child-directed or
best-interests model. 33 The American Bar Association’s Model Act Governing
Representation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings

28
29

30

31
32
33

Indiana recognizes this fact in part by granting party status to a child in CHINS cases. See IND. CODE § 3134-9-7(1) (2020).
In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014)
(holding the termination of parental rights is a deprivation of “an important interests warranting deference
and protection” and when the State wishes to terminate parental rights, it must do so while affording due
process protections to parents (internal quotations omitted) (quoting In re C.G., Z.G. v. Marion Cty. Dep’t of
Child Servs., 954 N.E.2d 910, 916–17 (Ind. 2011))); In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012) (noting
that “[e]very CHINS proceeding has the potential to interfere with the rights of parents in the upbringing of
the children” and that due process in a CHINS case is vital because deprivation of due process could lead to
a termination case); see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (holding parents have a fundamental
right to the care, custody, and control of their children).
ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, ACYF-CB-IM-17-02, HIGH QUALITY LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR ALL
PARTIES IN CHILD WELFARE PROCEEDINGS 2 (2017), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/cb/policy-guidance/im-17-02)
[hereinafter ACF MEMO]; see also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that
children have a fundamental right to safety and family integrity separate from their parents’ own right to
care, custody, and control of their children); Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief,
supra note 1, at 7 (class action suit brought against Marion County for failing to provide adequate
representation to minors, depriving them of due process in CHINS and TPR cases).
ACF MEMO, supra note 30, at 3.
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 7.
See generally id. (offering a methodology for understanding limitations in right to counsel statutes
throughout the United States).
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endorses the appointment of counsel for children in child welfare cases. 34 The Act
specifically recognizes the right of every child to have representation in all abuse,
neglect, dependency, or termination of parental rights proceedings, regardless of
their developmental level. 35 Commentary to the Act explicitly states that “[a] best
interest advocate does not replace the appointment of a lawyer.” 36
The Child Advocacy Institute and First Star Institute conducted a survey of
all states and their various models of child representation; they found that while
states historically based their models of child representation on best interests
advocacy, there was an increased authorization by statute for use of lawyers to
represent children. 37 The three most common approaches where lawyers are
utilized were: (1) a client-directed model, where the child’s attorney represents their
wishes and advocates on behalf of those wishes, while also accounting for any
diminished capacity; (2) a hybrid approach, where the child’s best interests and
wishes are both represented, either by a single attorney or by two different
attorneys; and (3) a best interests model, where attorneys are appointed to
represent a child’s best interests. 38 Beyond attorneys, many jurisdictions, including
Indiana, continue to use GAL or CASA volunteers who may or may not be
attorneys. 39
To compare the benefits and challenges via ethical implications, we will look
at four systems of four different states: Connecticut, Georgia, Arkansas, and
Indiana. Connecticut follows a model that provides mainly client-directed
representation, where a lawyer must advocate for the child’s wishes as any other
client-directed lawyer would pursuant to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 40 In
34

The Act provides that “[t]he court shall appoint a child’s lawyer for each child who is the subject of a
petition in an abuse and neglect proceeding. The appointment of a child’s lawyer must be made as soon as
practicable to ensure effective representation of the child and, in any event, before the first court hearing.”
ABA MODEL ACT GOVERNING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY
PROCEEDINGS § 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2011). The authors of the Report to the ABA’s House of Delegates related
to the Act state,
Courts in abuse and neglect cases dramatically shape a child’s entire future in that the court
decides where a child lives, with whom the child will live and whether the child’s parental
rights will be terminated. No other legal proceeding that pertains to children has such a major
effect on their lives. While the outcome of an abuse and neglect case has drastic implications
for both the parents and the children involved, only children’s physical liberty is threatened.
An abuse and neglect case that results in removal of the child from the home may immediately
or ultimately result in the child being thrust into an array of confusing and frightening
situations wherein the State moves the child from placement to placement with total
strangers, puts the child in a group home, commits the child to an institution, or even locks
the child up in detention for running away or otherwise violating a court order. Our notion of
basic civil rights . . . demand[s] that children and youth have a trained legal advocate to speak
on their behalf and to protect their legal rights.

35
36
37
38
39
40

Id. at 18.
Id. § 3 cmt.
Id.
DAVIS ET AL., supra note 5, at 8–9.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9, 31, 74.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-129a(2)(C) (2020).
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cases where the child is unable to express their wishes to counsel, however, the
state tasks attorneys with advocating for the best interests of the child. 41 Georgia is
an example of the hybrid model, providing children with counsel at all stages of
dependency and termination proceedings. 42 The Georgia model attorney is
predominantly client directed, where the attorney must advocate for the child’s
expressed wishes and owes all the duties to the child of a normal attorney-client
relationship. 43 There is, however, a hybrid option that is the focus for this
discussion, where the child’s attorney and the child’s GAL can be the same person,
unless and until there is an unresolvable conflict. 44 The Arkansas model provides
for an attorney who is appointed to represent the child’s best interests. 45 When
faced with a conflict between the attorney’s assessment of the child’s best interests
and the child’s wishes, an Arkansas attorney must communicate the child’s wishes
to the court in addition to advocating for the child’s best interests. 46 Indiana, as will
be discussed below, 47 is an example of a GAL/CASA supported best interests model
where attorneys and non-attorneys represent only a child’s best interests, with
discretionary appointments of counsel. 48
Each of these models comes with ethical implications, specifically in matters
of confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and client competency. Such implications are
present for attorneys in every aspect of their work, but those implications and
pitfalls can be particularly nuanced when an attorney is acting as GAL, counsel for
a child, or, in hybrid models, attorney-GAL.
Confidentiality is a particular problem in the Connecticut and Georgia
models, where attorneys are either appointed to be client directed or as hybrid
client- and best-interest attorneys. In Indiana, a lawyer may not reveal information
that relates to their representation of their client, unless that client gives informed
consent or otherwise impliedly authorizes it in order to carry out the
representation. 49 The majority of exceptions to this rule deal with a lawyer’s duty to
uphold the law, prevent and not enable crime, and prevent injury to other persons,
which encompasses both physical and economic injury. 50 Confidentiality is a
cherished cornerstone of the legal profession; it promotes a client’s willingness to
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

49
50

Id.
GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-103(a) (2020).
§ 15-11-103.
Id. § 15-11-104(b), (d).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f)(5)(A) (2020).
§ 9-27-316(f)(5)(B).
See infra Part III.
The Arkansas best-interests attorney model and the Indiana GAL/CASA model are not discussed in depth
in this section, though comparisons are noted; having an attorney only serve as a best-interests advocate is
substantially similar to Indiana’s current model of having GAL/CASAs serve a child’s best interests, with
the obvious difference being the requirement of an attorney fulfilling the role. However, the advocacy goal is
the same—the attorney or the GAL/CASA are only advocating for the child’s best interests, not the child’s
wishes. The best-interests model, with its advantages and disadvantages, is discussed in depth infra Part
III.
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(a) (2021).
Id. r. 1.6(b).
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share information and enhances a lawyer’s ability to use that information to
advocate for their client’s wishes. 51
The strict, best-interest representation provided by the Arkansas and
Indiana models of reliance on a GAL/CASA network sidesteps the concerns of
confidentiality by providing that the client is the child’s best interests and not
implicating an attorney-client relationship between the child and the attorney.
However, the conflict among confidentiality, best interests, and a lawyer’s role in
the Connecticut and Georgia models becomes apparent once the competing duties
between the GAL/CASA and attorney are laid forth. A best-interests attorney and
GAL/CASA’s role is to advocate for the child’s best interests, while a child-directed
attorney must advocate for the child’s expressed wishes and desires. 52 A childdirected attorney is bound by the duty of confidentiality, but a GAL/CASA for a
child has no such duty or privilege. 53 If a child-directed attorney is appointed to
represent a child in their capacity as an attorney and, during the course of that
representation, the attorney learns of information indicating that the child’s wishes
and desires are not in the child’s best interests, how is the attorney to proceed? It is
possible for the child-directed attorney, either in a purely client-directed model or in
a hybrid model, to request either a best interests attorney or GAL/CASA to be
appointed. Making such a request is an obvious option, but its obviousness is also
its main problem: it is a clear indicator that the client-directed attorney believes
that what they are advocating for may not be in the child’s best interests. Such a
red flag implicates the confidentiality due to a client by indicating that the advocacy
for the child and their best interests are not aligned and potentially undermines the
generally understood duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of their client.
There are exceptions in most states to the rule of confidentiality. For
example, in Indiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct, the exceptions include the
ability to reveal information if the attorney believes it is “necessary to prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; prevent the client from
committing a crime” or “to comply with other law or a court order.” 54 If a clientdirected lawyer is in possession of such information, these exceptions may permit
the lawyer to make a disclosure of confidential information and could justify the
lawyer raising a red flag for the court and other parties to a CHINS case by asking
for a GAL/CASA for the child. 55 The issue of the duty of confidentiality as it
51
52

53
54
55

Id. r. 1.6. cmt. 2.
See infra Part IV for definitions of a GAL/CASA. See also IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (“[A]
lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer may take
such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. A lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter.”).
IND. RULES of PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2021); Deasy-Leas v. Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding there is no privilege between a GAL and a child for whom the GAL is appointed).
IND. RULES of PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2021).
Indiana Rule 1.14 deals with clients with diminished capacity, which could include minors. Id. r. 1.14. An
option in this Rule is requesting a GAL for a client when there appears no other recourse for the attorneys
to effectively advocate for their client while also protecting their client. However, this course of action is
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pertains to a client-directed attorney could also be resolved by referencing other
rules of professional conduct regarding clients with diminished capacity. This
particular rule in Indiana, for example, provides that when a lawyer is representing
a client with diminished capacity, such as a child, the lawyer has the ability to take
“protective action[s]” that may “include[e] consulting with individuals or entities
that have the ability to take action to protect the client;” this power comes with an
authorization to disclose otherwise confidential information that is necessary for the
protective actions. 56 Arguably, the combination of these rules of professional
conduct could permit the client-directed attorney to seek the appointment of a GAL
or CASA for a child without running afoul of their duties. However, given the
nature of a CHINS case and the information routinely learned and uncovered
during such a case, this places client-directed lawyers in a position of constantly
and continually evaluating a wealth of such information and making
determinations about the information that could have grave repercussions. 57 As a
matter of policy regarding children and the role of attorneys, it is perhaps not useful
to leave a child-directed attorney as the sole arbiter of when death is reasonably
certain, when a bodily injury would qualify as substantial, or when their clients
have sufficiently diminished capacity, especially when those possibilities are in
conflict with their client’s wishes. Furthermore, the question of mandatory
reporting of child abuse and neglect for attorneys remains unsettled in Indiana. 58
Georgia-model attorneys who are appointed in dual roles of best-interests
advocate and client-directed attorney face a similar conflict regarding their duty of
confidentiality. Attorneys who serve in this dual capacity are also presented with an
additional problem: a conflict of interest. The Georgia model provides that the
client-directed attorney may also serve as the GAL for the same child but requires
that if there is an unresolvable conflict between the child’s wishes and best
interests, the same person may not serve as both the GAL and the client-directed
attorney. 59 Lawyers in Indiana may not represent a client if the representation
involves concurrent conflicts of interest, which occur when

56
57

58
59

meant to be a last resort, not a default option, as it could easily become in CHINS matters if the starting
place is appointing an attorney for every child. Id. r. 1.14(b).
Id. at (b), (c).
As a matter of necessity, “reasonably certain” death and “substantial bodily injury” are not defined in the
Rules. Id. r. 1.6. This vagueness allows for the Rule to cover all types of situations and allows for flexibility.
However, the lack of definitions could have serious repercussions when it comes to the welfare of children.
For example, is sexual abuse a “substantial” bodily injury? If so, what types of sexual abuse would count as
substantial bodily injury to a child? Must there be bodily injury and how severe must that injury be? Do
mental health repercussions and trauma count as substantial bodily injury? For more discussion on this
topic, see Derelle Watson-Duvall, Carey Haley Wong & Katherine Meger Kelsey, Lawyers for Children on a
Lawyer’s Duty to Report Child Abuse and Neglect, RES GESTAE, May 2016, at 18,
https://issuu.com/res_gestae/docs/rg-may-2016, and In re Blickman, 158 N.E.3d 752, 760–62 (Ind. 2020),
which is a recent disciplinary case in which the court discussed but declined to decide whether attorneys
are subject to Indiana’s mandatory reporting laws in connection with information they obtained during the
course of representation of a client.
See IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 15-11-103 to -104 (2020).
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the representation of one client [is] directly adverse to another client;
or there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more
clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to
another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal
interest of the lawyer. 60
While lawyers acting as GAL/CASAs in Indiana are generally not thought of
as acting in their capacity as lawyers, this rule is broad enough to encompass their
duties as GAL/CASAs as well their actual capacity as a client-directed attorney.
With a single attorney appointed to serve as both a GAL/CASA and a client-directed
attorney, there is an immediate conflict of interest whenever the child’s wishes do
not align with how the attorney-GAL/CASA perceives the child’s best interests and
this conflict will materially impact the attorney’s ability to represent their client, as
well as the attorney’s ability to effectively perform their other duties as a
GAL/CASA. This conflict occurs often enough that some states address it in rules of
court or statute, and it demands careful planning and immediate resolution so that
advocacy for the child can be protected and adequately provided. 61 In contrast, the
Arkansas and Indiana models, in their strict duty to the best interests of the child,
again avoid the issue of conflicts between the child’s wishes and the child’s best
interests. 62
A final consideration is that of client competency. In states that provide for a
blanket appointment of counsel for all children, it begs the question of how such
representation proceeds in the case of infants, pre- or nonverbal children, or
children who are old enough to speak but not old enough to make rational decisions
about their needs and desires. Clearly, the attorneys must proceed under a bestinterests standard, but then why not simply appoint a GAL/CASA? The founding
principles of an attorney-client relationship and how representation by a lawyer
proceeds within our judicial system are premised on the idea that a client is heavily
involved in the process, constantly informed, and making key decisions. However,
being a minor may impinge on these founding principles. 63 In Indiana, Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.14 addresses clients with diminished capacities; it provides
in relevant part that a lawyer with a diminished-capacity client should maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship to the extent that is possible. 64 When it is not
possible, the lawyer should take reasonably protective necessary action, which may
60
61

62

63
64

IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1)–(2).
For an example of a model where there are detailed provisions on how to proceed in addressing and
attempting to resolve the conflict, see TENN. SUPREME COURT RULES r. 40(1)–(2) (2020), which addresses
fully investigating the child’s best interests and the arguments in favor of the child’s position, discussing
with the child various options and positions, as well as the benefits of risks of each position and if a
resolution on the conflict cannot be reached, providing for another lawyer to be appointed to represent the
child’s best interests while the first lawyer advocates for the child’s position.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-316(f)(5)(A)–(B) (2021); IND. CODE §§ 31-9-2-28 to -50 (2020). Both define a
GAL/CASA as advocating for the best interests of a child. With their duties explicitly defined as bestinterests advocates, there is no conflicting duty to the child’s wishes, other than a duty to express those
wishes to the court.
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 1.
Id. r. 1.14(a).
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include the appointment of a GAL. 65 Even using Indiana legal principles, we arrive
at the same spot—that client competency is a concern with younger children, and
their age and developmental capacity necessitates the use of a GAL/CASA.
This again makes client competency a nonissue for Arkansas and Indiana
models, as their main focus is best interests. However, the Arkansas best-interests
model and the Indiana GAL/CASA network model present other problems. While
these problems are not primarily ethical, the sole focus on best-interests
representation undercuts the fundamental rights afforded to children, as discussed
below. 66
The ethical considerations presented by the Connecticut client-directed model
and the Georgia hybrid model primarily, but not exclusively, include matters of
confidentiality, conflicts of interest, and client competency. Across-the-board models
like these implicate ethical considerations in different ways, ways that would either
1) provoke careful reconsideration, and perhaps revision, of the Rules of
Professional Conduct for child welfare attorneys or 2) require appointing two
attorneys—one to serve the client’s wishes and one to serve their best interests.
Looking to other states’ models only carries us so far. Indiana is not a blank
slate; it has existing, well-established GAL and CASA systems and statutory
schemes with various strengths and weaknesses. Rather than transpose an
automatic right to counsel for all children, with all the ensuing ethical concerns
discussed above, it makes more sense to develop a hybrid model that utilizes the
GAL and CASA systems to their fullest and most useful extent and creates and uses
a right to counsel for all other situations, thereby avoiding many of the above
discussed issues. In order to come to a reasonable sense of what kind of right to
counsel for children would work for Indiana, we must first examine the gap between
the rights offered to adult parties in CHINS cases, the manner in which adult
parties may protect those rights, the rights and protections offered to children in
CHINS cases.
III. THE RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS GAP IN INDIANA LAW
A. Rights Granted to All Parties
Indiana’s juvenile dependency system originates with Child in Need of
Services (CHINS) cases. CHINS cases may turn into Termination of the ParentChild Relationship (TPR) cases, and as such, a TPR case is an outgrowth and part of
an underlying CHINS case. This section primarily discusses CHINS proceedings,
though the references to CHINS and TPR are often interchangeable. Party status in
a CHINS case is bestowed upon the child, the child’s parents, the child’s guardian,
the child’s custodian, the Department of Child Services (DCS), and the child’s GAL
or CASA. 67 This grant of party status accords them the rights that accompany party
65
66
67

Id. r. 1.14(b).
See infra Part III.
IND. CODE § 31-34-9-7.
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status under the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure. 68 Children, adult parties, and
agency or institutional parties, such as DCS or a GAL/CASA, are granted
essentially identical rights. Children, parents, guardians, and custodians are
specifically permitted to cross-examine witnesses, 69 to obtain witnesses and other
evidence by the use of the compulsory process, 70 and to introduce evidence on their
own behalf. 71 Although neither DCS nor GAL/CASA agencies are listed in these
statutes’ specific enumeration of rights, they are granted party status and are
specifically granted all the rights of a party under the Indiana Trial Rules. 72 Party
status grants them the rights of cross-examination, compulsory process, ability to
present evidence to make their case, and more. 73
B. Adult Exercise of Rights
Adult parties to a CHINS case have the ability to exercise their enumerated
rights through their presence at and participation in hearings and through the use
of counsel. The right of an adult party to be present at and participate in a CHINS
hearing is not one laid forth in the Indiana Code but rather is frequently discussed
through case law on the topics of incarcerated parents and continuances. Indiana
case law indicates that it is highly preferable to secure the presence of an
incarcerated parent. 74 Case law regarding continuances also discusses the
68

69
70
71

72
73
74

The Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure do not provide a right to counsel but do make provisions for a party’s
ability to file pleadings, receive service, obtain and present evidence, seek relief from the court, and
otherwise use the compulsive process. See, e.g., IND. R. TR. P. r. 4, 5, 26.
IND. CODE §§ 31-32-2-1(1), -3(b)(1).
§ 31-32-2-1(2) (children); id. § 31-32-2-3(b)(2) (parents, guardians, or custodians).
§ 31-32-2-1(3) (children); § 31-32-2-3(b)(3) (parents, guardians, or custodians). Children who are charged
with a delinquent act are granted additional rights, in large part due to risk of possible detention and
confinement, and these rights specifically include a right to counsel. Id. § 31-32-2-2(1). The statute
providing for rights for children in CHINS and TPR proceedings does not mention specific proceedings in
which these rights apply and is merely under the Chapter 2 subheading, which states generally that the
chapter pertains to the rights of persons who are subject to the juvenile court jurisdiction. See id. § 31-32-2.
However, the statute that provides the rights of adult parties in CHINS and TPR proceedings specifically
spells out the proceedings under which adults are granted these rights. § 31-32-2-3(a). These proceedings
are enumerated as (1) CHINS proceedings; “(2) proceedings to determine whether [an adult party] should
participate in a program of care, treatment, or rehabilitation for the child; (3) [p]roceedings to determine
whether the parent or guardian of the estate of a child should be held financially responsible for services
provided to the parent or guardian or the child;” and (4) TPR proceedings. Id.
§ 31-34-9-7.
See supra note 68 discussion.
See In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 922–23 (Ind. 2011)
(adopting eleven factors that trial courts should balance in determining whether to transport an
incarcerated parent to a termination of parental rights hearing); In re Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of A.P., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (noting an error in the trial court’s failure
to have the father transported from jail so that he could participate in CHINS review hearing and hearing
on motion to prohibit contact with his son); see also In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of
M.M.E., 146 N.E.3d 922, 924–25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (reversing termination due to procedural irregularities
in the CHINS case, which flowed into the termination case; irregulates included: (1) there was no amended
CHINS petition identifying the father as a parent or alleging why the child was a CHINS as to the father;
(2) the initial/detention hearing concerning the father was not timely held; (3) the trial court did not enter a
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preference of having the adult parties present, and discussions within those
opinions often highlight the effect the lack of the party’s participation in the hearing
had upon the outcome. 75 In addition to their general ability to be present at
hearings, adult parties have certain rights to counsel in CHINS and TPR cases.
Adult parties have a categorical right to counsel in TPR proceedings. 76 Adult parties
to a CHINS proceeding have a right to counsel, conditioned upon both their request
for counsel and their indigency. 77
The rights of presence and counsel work in conjunction to ensure that adult
parties can exercise and enforce their rights to present evidence, call and cross
examine witnesses, participate in hearings, and otherwise engage in due process.
By either being present and bearing the burden of self-representation or by being
appointed counsel and allowing counsel to represent them, adult parties are
ensured a measure of the protection of these statutorily enumerated rights, as well
as larger protections for their due process rights.

75

76

77

denial on the father’s behalf and there was no factfinding hearing for him; (4) the father had no
dispositional hearing or decree; and (5) he received no case plans); In re Involuntary Termination of the
Parent-Child Relationship of J.T., 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the trial
court’s failure to secure the presence at the termination hearing of the father did not deny him due process
of law but clarifying that a parent has a right to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner” in the termination proceeding, and counsel should seek a procedure whereby the parent can
participate in the hearing (internal quotations omitted) (quoting McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729 N.E.2d 972,
975 (Ind. 2000))). This preference is not an unconditional right, and there is a long line of cases where the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to secure a parent’s presence. See, e.g., A.B. v. Ind. Dep’t.
of Child Servs., 61 N.E.3d 1182, 1187–88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding the trial court did not err in
excluding the father from participating in the hearing; the father obtained permission to appear by
telephone, but after his constant disruptive behavior, the trial court elected to proceed without him when he
refused to appear in person; he was given the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner, but his ultimate absence from the hearing was the result of his own disruptive actions
and his decision not to appear in person despite a clear ability to do so).
See In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 248–49 (Ind.
2014) (holding, inter alia, that the continuance should have been granted as the mother had a substantially
significant interest in being present at the proceedings and a proceeding without her ensured that her voice
was not heard at all); see also Powers v. Blunck, 109 N.E.3d 1053, 1056 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that
default as the basis for a custody order is generally disfavored in custody disputes and that the trial court
erred in denying the mother’s continuance where she provided good cause for requesting a continuance).
IND. CODE § 31-32-2-5 (providing that a parent is entitled to legal representation in TPR proceedings); id. §
31-32-4-1(2) (providing that a parent in a TPR proceeding is a person entitled to representation by counsel);
id. § 31-32-4-3 (providing that if a parent does not have a lawyer in a TPR proceeding who can provide them
with conflict-free representation, and the parent has not lawfully waived counsel, the court “shall appoint
counsel for the parent”).
See In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2014)
(holding that section 31-34-4-6 requires a trial court to appoint counsel for a parent in a CHINS case if: (1)
the parent requests the appointment of counsel, and (2) the trial court finds that the parent is indigent).
There are other statutes and codes that provide for a conditional right to counsel in CHINS proceedings.
These include section 31-34-4-6(a)(2)(A) of the Indiana Code, which provides the basis for the G.P. decision;
section 31-32-4-3(b) of the Indiana Code, which provides that a court may appoint counsel for a parent in
“any other proceeding,” which necessarily includes CHINS proceedings; and the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(2), (d) (2003), which requires appointment of an attorney for a parent who is
on duty with U.S. Armed Forces and to grant a ninety day stay of proceedings.
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C. Child Exercise of Rights and Prevention Thereof
Although children exercise the same theoretical rights under the Indiana
Rules of Trial Procedure and the Indiana Code, 78 there are several problematic
divergences in the rights afforded to children and adults, as well as roadblocks in
children’s ability to exercise those rights. The issues of presence in the courtroom
and counsel are two major hurdles that Indiana must confront in order to address
the fundamental rights of children in CHINS cases.
In CHINS proceedings, a child may be broadly excluded from any part of any
hearing for good cause, which must be shown in the record. 79 This exclusion stands
in stark contrast to the aforementioned case law emphasizing the importance of a
parent’s presence and participation in the CHINS proceedings, although it is not an
unqualified right. 80 The good cause exception is also not a mere instance of separate
statutes written in a manner resulting in unintentional conflict. The statute that
actually grants children rights in CHINS proceedings in the same breath specifies
that these rights are subject to the ability of a court to exclude a child from the
CHINS proceedings. 81 There is no similar statutory mechanism by which an adult
party can be so broadly and categorically excluded from hearings, and indeed, their
presence is encouraged and required to the extent that is possible and practicable.
In addition to the issue of exclusion from the courtroom, there is no provision
of a right to counsel for children in CHINS proceedings that is analogous to the
right provided to adult parties. It is permissible for a court to appoint counsel for
any child in any proceeding, which presumably includes both CHINS and TPR
proceedings. 82 However, this appointment is entirely at the court’s discretion and,
in practice, is not used often. Even for CHINS categories in which the child
themselves must admit or deny the allegations, there is no mandatory provision of
counsel. 83
This creates an unequal playing field for adults and children. All parties to a
CHINS case (and potentially later on, to a resulting TPR case) are granted the same
statutory rights, particularly in the context of a court hearing. 84 However, one
category of party—children—is then placed at a disadvantage by removing their
automatically assumed ability to be present at any hearing in order to exercise
those rights. Children are further disadvantaged by the failure to provide counsel
who would help protect those rights, either with the children present, or more
importantly, in their absence. It is important that children be granted the right to
78
79
80
81
82
83

84

See IND. CODE § 31-34-9-7; see also supra note 68 discussion.
IND. CODE § 31-32-6-8(2).
See § 31-34-9-7; supra Part III.B; supra note 68 discussion.
IND. CODE § 31-32-2-1 (“Except when a child may be excluded from a hearing under IC 31-32-6, a child is
entitled to . . . .”).
Id. § 31-32-4-2(b).
See id. § 31-34-10-7 (a court “shall determine whether the child admits or denies the allegations” that the
child is a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3.5 (victim of human or sexual trafficking) or Indiana
Code section 31-34-1-6 (child substantially endangers own health or the health of another person)).
See supra notes 67–73 discussion and accompanying text.

2021]

A Child’s Right to Counsel

181

obtain evidence and witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, and introduce evidence on
one’s own behalf, but meaningful exercise of these rights often requires being
represented by an attorney. 85 Indiana statutes appear to acknowledge this reality
by grouping together the right to be represented by an attorney with the rights
afforded to that person, a perhaps tacit acknowledgement that in order to effectively
exercise those rights, counsel is required. 86 Indiana even goes so far as to codify a
state policy proclaiming to recognize and protect the legal rights of children; the
statute provides that it is the policy of Indiana to provide a judicial system that
“recognizes and enforces the legal rights of children and their parents.” 87 The equal
footing upon which children and adult parties are placed is grounded on these
rights to make a case through witnesses and evidence. However, children are then
placed at a double disadvantage by making it possible to exclude them from all
court proceedings and then also refuse them the appointment of counsel, who could
potentially protect these rights in their absence from the courtroom. By granting
children rights and then placing such hurdles in their path, Indiana law effectively
guts these rights, unless a court decides, in its discretion, to allow a child to be
present or to allow them counsel, or both. Even allowing a child to be present but
not appointing counsel for that child is a disingenuous provision of these rights; a
child is even more ill-equipped than an adult party to exercise the rights granted to
them as a self-represented litigant.
D. Failure of Reasoning for Limitations on Children’s Rights
There is a long-standing line of reasoning as to why adult parties to a CHINS
case are granted these statutory rights and are given counsel; the analysis is
outlined in the United States Constitution, the Indiana Constitution, and the case
law interpreting these rights in the context of family and juvenile law. 88 There is a
85

86

87

88

Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014) (“[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a
trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” (citing In
re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. 2014))). While
Judicial Canon 2.2 provides that judges assist self-represented litigants in a limited fashion, such as asking
questions in plain language, asking clarifying questions, providing some explanations, this Rule does not
permit a judge to help a self-represented litigant with true legal strategy or process. IND. JUDICIAL CONDUCT
RULE 2.2. Furthermore, children are routinely excluded from the courtroom, rendering the help from a
judge moot. Id. cmt. 5.
See IND. CODE § 31-34-4-6(a)(2) (providing that DCS must notify an adult party to a CHINS case that they
have the right to “be represented by an attorney, to cross examine witnesses, and present evidence on
[their] own behalf” at each CHINS court proceeding).
Id. § 31-10-2-1(10)(B). The statute also implicates other issues of fairness pertaining to children by
providing that Indiana has a policy of “recogniz[ing] the importance of family and children in our society;
recogniz[ing] the responsibility of the state to enhance the viability of children and family in our society; . . .
[and] ensur[ing] that children within the juvenile justice system are treated as persons in need of care,
protection, treatment, and rehabilitation.” § 31-10-2-1(1), (2), (5).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (citing a long lineage of cases and concluding that precedent
shows that “it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
the fundamental right of parents to make decisions” regarding their own children); see also Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) (holding that the primary role of parents in raising children in established,
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similar long-standing line of reasoning as to why the rights and protections afforded
to children are more limited and restricted. Although children have the same liberty
interests as adults, these liberty interests can often be restricted and have
reasonable limitations placed upon them. 89 Declining to provide a right to counsel
for children is an outgrowth of the line of reasoning that while children have the
same rights as adults, those rights can be restricted or limited in ways that are
attributable to their minority. Additionally, the rights and interests of children are
generally thought to be protected by the various parties in a CHINS case—the
parents or other adult parties; DCS; and the child’s representative, the GAL/CASA.
Perhaps, then, it should come as no surprise that parents are given the right to
counsel in a CHINS proceeding while children are not.
This argument, however, weakens when considered in a broader context.
Granting counsel to adult parties in CHINS proceedings is a logical and wise policy
decision. The CHINS and TPR proceedings are complex and confusing; counsel can
assist parents, guardians, and custodians in navigating the process and procedures
at every step of the case, making the case run more smoothly for the parties, the
State, and the courts. Counsel is also instrumental in protecting the statutorily
enumerated rights of adult parties, 90 as well as protecting parents’ fundamental
rights to the care, custody, and control of their children. 91 However, if counsel is so
effective at safeguarding the process for parents and adult parties, the same would
be true for children as well, who have the same interests at stake. Furthermore, the
provision of counsel has proven to result in a net positive gain for child welfare
systems across the country; when counsel is granted to parents and to children,
studies have shown that there is better judicial economy, an increase in party
engagement, more specifically tailored case plans to the family, a higher perception
of fairness by all parties, and better outcomes for children. 92
In addition to the weakness of the argument for honoring the differences
between children and adults by failing to provide counsel to children, there is a
logical inconsistency which must be addressed, as it further weakens the argument

89

90
91

92

fundamental, and beyond debate); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that this
liberty interest includes the right to direct upbringing and education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923) (holding that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights of parents to
establish their own homes and raise their children); Crafton v. Gibson, 725 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children,” and there is a presumption that a
fit parent acts in their children’s best interests.).
See supra notes 17–20, 29; Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1977); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); see also Y.A.
ex rel. Fleener v. Bayh, 657 N.E.2d 410, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a child in the custody of state
officials has the constitutional right to be free from abuse or neglect, but this did not include the right to a
specific residential placement).
See IND. CODE §§ 31-32-2-3, 31-34-4-6(a)(2).
The Preamble to the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct provides that lawyers, as members of the legal
profession, not only represent clients but are also officers of the court and are citizens charged with “special
responsibility for the quality of justice.” IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2020). The Preamble
speaks at length about the importance of lawyers in upholding and enhancing justice in Indiana. Id.
ACF MEMO, supra note 30.
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against providing counsel to children. Adult parties who are not parents are granted
rights superior to that of children in CHINS cases.
As discussed in Part I, parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the
care, custody, and control of their own children. 93 This interest, practically
speaking, means parents have the right to have their children in their care and to
make decisions for their children as they see fit. 94 Thus, state intervention into a
parent’s right to have their child in their care and to make decisions for their child
very much implicates a parent’s fundamental liberty interests. Since children also
have a fundamental liberty interest at stake in CHINS and TPR proceedings, all
persons, including children, are entitled to legal representation when their right to
liberty is at stake. 95 When a state imposes on that liberty right, it creates a “special
relationship” between the state and that person, placing a duty on the state to
protect that person. 96 If the state assumes this responsibility by removing a child
from a parent, then the failure to follow through on the obligation to place the child
in a safe and stable environment would constitute a deprivation of a child’s liberty
interest. 97 Again, this case law distills down to the basic argument that if a child’s
liberty interests are threatened by incarceration, then a child’s liberty interests are
also threatened by being taken into custody by DCS. 98
Generally speaking, the overarching risk that a child faces in both CHINS
and TPR proceedings is substantially similar to the risk that parents face: a
potential loss of family integrity. 99 By having the state intervene in a family’s life by
virtue of necessity, all members of that family lose the ability to make their own
determinations about the course of their lives, up to and including where the child
lives and whether the parents will legally remain the child’s parents.
With these federal liberty interests outlined, we turn back to Indiana
provisions. In Indiana, party status is granted to adults who are a child’s parents,
guardians, or custodians. 100 A parent is defined, “for the purposes of juvenile law,

93

94
95
96

97
98

99

100

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (citing a long lineage of cases and concluding that precedent shows that it cannot be
doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of
parents to make their own decisions regarding their own children); see also Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232 (holding
that the primary role of parents in raising children in established, fundamental, and beyond debate); Pierce,
268 U.S. at 534–35 (holding that this liberty interest includes the right to direct upbringing and education);
Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (holding that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights of
parents to establish their own homes and raise their children).
See Troxel, 530 U.S. 57; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Pierce, 268 U.S. 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. 390.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967); see also supra notes 17–20, 29.
Doe ex rel. Magee v. Covington Cty. Sch. Dist., 675 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Walton v.
Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995)).
See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990).
Y.A. ex rel. Fleener v. Bayh, 657 N.E.2d 410, 419 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), stands for this proposition at least in
part; the opinion provides that a child in the custody of state officials has the constitutional right to be free
from abuse or neglect.
See Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that children have a fundamental
right to safety and family integrity entirely separate from their parents’ own right to care, custody, and
control of their children).
IND. CODE § 31-34-9-7(2) (2020).
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[as] a biological or an adoptive parent” and includes alleged fathers. 101 Guardians
are defined within juvenile law as “a person appointed by a court to have the care
and custody of a child or the child’s estate, or both.” 102 A custodian, “for the
purposes of juvenile law, means a person with whom a child resides.” 103 “Custodian”
has several meanings:
(1) a license applicant or licensee of . . . a foster home or residential
child care facility . . . ; a child care center . . . ; [or] a child care home;
(2) a person who is responsible for care, supervision, or welfare of
children while providing services as . . . [part of a child care home,
center, facility, or school]; (3) a child caregiver 104 . . . ; (4) a member of
the household of the child’s noncustodial parent; or (5) an individual
who has or intends to have direct contact, on a regular and continuing
basis, with a child for whom the individual provides care and
supervision. 105
The categories of guardians and custodians combine to create a broad swath
of adults who may qualify as adult parties to a CHINS or TPR proceeding and are
granted rights on par with those granted to children. However, despite this allencompassing attempt to sweep important adults in the lives of children into
CHINS and TPR proceedings, the fact remains that only parents and children have
federally enumerated liberty interests at stake. 106 Yet, adult parties beyond just
parents in CHINS proceedings are granted a right to counsel. This results in
nonparents being entitled to counsel in the same CHINS proceedings where
children are not. Consequently, the rights of third-party nonparents are on par with
the rights of legal parents, while the rights afforded to children, whose actual
liberty interests are at stake, hinge on their presence in the court-room and a
possibility of a rarely granted conditional right to counsel.
Guardians and custodians, while undoubtedly both emotionally and
financially invested in the children in their care, are by definition not the parents of
the children. They do not have the same constitutionally protected standing in
regards to those children—namely, the care, custody, and control of children who

101

102
103
104

105
106

Id. § 31-9-2-88. Alleged fathers are defined, for the purposes of paternity law (which is within the
jurisdiction of juvenile law), as “any man claiming to be or charged with being a child’s biological father.”
Id. § 31-9-2-9.
Id. § 31-9-2-49(b).
Id. § 31-9-2-31(a).
A child caregiver is subsequently and broadly defined as a person who is not a child’s parent, guardian,
close family member, or other legal custodian and who provides care and supervision of a child “at a
residential property that is not the child’s place of residence,” and the person is not required to be licensed,
provides care while unattended by the child’s parents, guardian, or custodian, and the person receives more
than $2,000 per year for the supervision for the child. Id. § 31-9-2-16.4.
§ 31-9-2-31(b).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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are not their own biological or adoptive children. 107 Indiana has granted guardians
and custodians rights in a CHINS proceeding on par with the rights given to
parents and children and has given guardians and custodians a right to counsel in
CHINS proceedings on par with parents despite the lack of fundamental rights, yet
leaving children unrepresented in most cases.
IV.INDIANA’S REMEDY TO THE RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS GAP
If children are afforded the same rights as adult parties in CHINS cases but
will likely be excluded from any hearings and not be provided counsel to protect
their rights and interests, what system does Indiana have in place to address this
gap? Other than the discretionary provision of counsel, Indiana’s manner of
addressing the need to protect a child’s interests relies on the use of GALs and
CASAs. As the sole representative of the child in most child welfare cases, it is
reasonable to ask whether the role of a GAL/CASA can simultaneously balance and
adequately protect the party rights enumerated in the Indiana Code, the
fundamental liberty interests of the child, and the child’s best interests.
A GAL/CASA appointment for a child is mandatory in Indiana in CHINS
proceedings, 108 and Indiana law makes the GAL/CASA a legal party to the CHINS
case. 109 The explicitly stated role of a GAL/CASA is to “represent and protect the
best interests of the child.” 110 Although GAL and CASA duties are delineated in
separate statutes, the duties are identical: representing and protecting the best
interests of the child and providing the child with services as requested by the
Court. This includes researching, examining, advocating, facilitating, and
monitoring the child’s situation. 111 GALs and CASAs must complete training in the
identification and treatment of child abuse and neglect, as well as training in early
childhood, child, and adolescent development. 112
It seems apparent by these definitions that a GAL or CASA can adequately
protect and represent a child’s best interests; that is the whole purpose of their
function. Whether or not a GAL or CASA can adequately protect a child’s statutorily
enumerated rights or their fundamental liberty interests are questions that must be
examined more closely.
107

108
109
110
111
112

Crafton v. Gibson, 725 N.E.2d 78, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73
(2000)) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the fundamental
right of parents to make decisions about the care, custody, and control of their children and that there is a
presumption that a fit parent acts in their children’s best interests); see also § 29-3-3-3 (providing that
unless there is a court order or law otherwise, parents have the right to custody of their child and the right
to make decisions for their child); In re Guardianship of B.H., 770 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ind. 2002) (quoting
Gilmore v. Kitson, 74 N.E. 1083, 1084 (Ind. 1905)) (holding that “natural parents are entitled to the custody
of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their care, control,
and education”).
IND. CODE § 31-34-10-3.
Id. § 31-34-9-7(4).
Id. § 31-32-3-6.
Id. §§ 31-9-2-28(b)(2)–(3), 31-9-2-50(b)(1)–(2).
§§ 31-9-2-28(b)(1), 31-9-2-50(b)(3); 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(B)(xiii) (2018).
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While the GAL and CASA statutes provide guidance on advocating for a
child’s best interests, case law assists in elaborating on the extent to which these
duties may be carried. In the termination of parental rights case Kern v. Wolf, the
court affirmed the termination of parental rights judgment against the mother's
claim that the CASA’s zealous representation of the child was improper. 113 The
mother specifically objected to the CASA’s actions of obtaining depositions,
summoning and examining witnesses, and otherwise presenting evidence; however,
the court opined that the CASA statute provides that a CASA is empowered to
represent and protect a child’s best interests, and if those words are given their
ordinary meaning, the CASA acted within the parameters of the statute in her
actions. 114 Kern perhaps lends the strongest support that GALs and CASAs are also
empowered to protect the rights enumerated in the Indiana Code, cross-examine
witnesses, obtain witnesses and other evidence by the use of the compulsory
process, and introduce evidence on the child’s behalf. A variety of other statutes
permit a GAL or CASA to file a TPR petition, 115 seek a protective order regarding a
child during a CHINS proceeding for certain delineated reasons relevant to the
CHINS proceedings, 116 file parental participation petitions, 117 seek modification of a
dispositional order, 118 and file pre-dispositional reports. 119 In order to perform this
role, the GAL or CASA is granted broad access to records and information. 120
Taking these statutes and case law together, it seems apparent that a
GAL/CASA is empowered to act on behalf of a child’s best interests in a manner
that is substantially similar to the rights granted to a child in a CHINS proceeding.
A GAL/CASA is able to file motions, obtain depositions, use the compulsory process
to seek and present evidence, and require witnesses to appear; furthermore, the
GAL/CASA has access to the same information to which the child has access.
Assuming the goals of the GAL/CASA are aligned with the desires of the child, a
GAL/CASA can adequately represent and protect a child’s interests.
That assumption, of course, is the hinge of the question. The explicitly stated
duty of a GAL/CASA is to represent a child’s best interests; 121 by way of contrast, an
attorney representing a client must ascertain a client’s stated wishes and desires,
113
114
115

116
117
118
119
120

121

622 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
Id.
IND. CODE §§ 31-35-2-4(a)(2)–(3), 31-35-3-4; see also In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child
Relationship of Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 899–900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that a CASA has the statutory
authority to independently file and thus prosecute a petition to terminate parental rights; therefore, it was
not improper for the CASA to prosecute the termination petition concerning the oldest child, despite DCS’s
opposition to that particular termination petition).
IND. CODE §§ 31-32-13-1, 31-34-25-1(2).
Id. § 31-34-16-1(2).
Id. § 31-34-23-1(2)(B)(iv)–(v).
Id. § 31-34-18-1(b)(2)(C)–(D).
See id. § 31-39-2-3(a) (providing access to juvenile court records to all parties to a CHINS case without a
court order); id. § 31-34-18-6(a)–(b) (providing access to all pre-dispositional reports); id. § 31-39-4-4(a)
(providing access to law enforcement records); id. § 31-33-18-2(7) (providing access to DCS reports and other
materials); id. § 16-39-2-9(a) (providing access to mental health records of child and parents).
Id. §§ 31-9-2-28(b)(2)–(3), 31-9-2-50(b)(1)–(2).
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keep the client informed, facilitate client-directed litigation, and maintain the
client’s confidences. 122 While it is possible for both a child’s best interests and
wishes to be aligned, the potential for conflict between the duties of a GAL/CASA
and an attorney is obvious: an attorney must facilitate their client’s wishes and
advocate for them to that end, while a GAL/CASA must represent and protect a
child’s best interests, which can be contrary to the child’s wishes.
Beyond the conflict between the roles of a GAL/CASA and an attorney, there
are other differences between the duties owed to a child by a GAL/CASA and an
attorney. For example, a GAL/CASA maintains no privilege or right to
confidentiality between themselves and the child for whom they are appointed. 123 In
fact, in order to successfully fulfill their duty to protect a child’s best interests, a
GAL/CASA may need to reveal confidences and other sensitive information that
they obtained from the child or on the child’s behalf. Attorneys, by contrast, have a
duty of confidentiality. 124 An attorney is expressly client directed and is tasked with
advocating for their client’s wishes. 125 While a GAL/CASA is encouraged to
summarize and present a child’s wishes, which can potentially protect a child’s
delineated rights without the appointment of counsel, the GAL/CASA is not
required to advocate for those wishes. Additionally, there is an unsteady body of
case law surrounding the admissibility of a GAL/CASA’s testimony regarding a
child’s statements and wishes. 126
It is apparent that while a GAL/CASA is an effective tool in representing a
child’s best interests, the same may not be true of utilizing a GAL/CASA to protect a
child’s statutorily given rights and their fundamental liberty interests. When a
child’s wishes and best interests align, the GAL/CASA can effectively advocate to
represent and protect the same. However, when the child’s best interests and
wishes do not align, the gap between the rights Indiana offers to children and the
protections it offers to safeguard those rights is once again exposed.
This reasoning leads again to the conclusion that at least some categories of
children in Indiana would benefit from a right to counsel, even if many categories of
122

123

124
125
126

IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2, 1.4, 1.6 (2021). The Nicole K. ex rel. Linda R. v. Marion County
complaint notes this difference between the role of a GAL/CASA and the role of an attorney and argues
“[t]he roles of a GAL/CASA and an attorney are not competitive or mutually exclusive; rather, they are
complementary but distinct. In Indiana, as in most states, it is not the role of the GAL/CASA to protect the
legal rights of the child, nor are they trained to do so.” Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief, supra note 1, at 5.
Deasy-Leas v. Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 94, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that Indiana has no statutorily
enacted privilege for communications between a guardian ad litem and a child, and no privilege can exist
absent a statute; despite this lack of privilege, a GAL is not a tool for discovery, and a GAL’s records and
files are still subject to general principles of confidentiality under Indiana and federal law).
IND. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (2021).
Id. r. 1.2, 1.4.
See In re Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017)
(holding trial court’s admission of the GAL’s testimony on statements the children made to her about their
desires for future placement did not warrant reversal but noting that it was hearsay); see also In re
Adoption of D.V.H., 604 N.E.2d 634, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that the appointment of GAL
contemplates summarization of a child’s desires and state of mind, and holding that the ultimate hearsay
issue was waived).
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children presently find their rights to be adequately protected by the existing GAL
and CASA programs. Indiana laws already provide for the appointment of a
GAL/CASA, and it makes little sense, from either a policy or legislative perspective,
to discard a well-functioning system to enact a new system with its own set of
problems. Since the GAL and CASA systems can adequately protect the rights of
many of Indiana’s children, it is logical to leave those systems in place and
supplement them with a right to counsel for children whose rights and interests
would not be adequately protected by a GAL or CASA.
Rather than starting from a default of providing child-directed counsel to
children, Indiana should begin as it has been—it provides, as a default minimum, a
GAL, CASA, or both to children in all CHINS and TPR cases. In addition to the
provision of a GAL or CASA, it may also be necessary for a child to be given a childdirected attorney who advocates for things beyond the scope of the role of the
GAL/CASA. This hybrid system of a GAL/CASA and a right to counsel could strike
a careful balance between the protection of liberty interests and practical concerns.
This type of hybrid system could be integrated relatively quickly into the
existing juvenile law system in an Indiana-specific manner, with maximum effect
and minimal disruption. The below-proposed hybrid system will also alleviate the
ethical implications and concerns of an across-the-board right to counsel, while also
adequately addressing the need to protect the fundamental liberty interests of
children.
V. PROPOSAL FOR RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR CHILDREN IN INDIANA
While there are certainly arguments, and nationwide decisions granting an
across-the-board right to counsel for children in child welfare cases, there are just
as many examples of a more measured approach. Adopting a wholesale right to
counsel for children in Indiana would put enormous strain on Indiana’s juvenile
legal system. 127 However, it would be comparatively easy to target specific
populations of children who most require counsel and provide either an automatic
right to counsel or a conditional right to counsel for those children. The proposed
groups of children who would receive an automatic right to counsel are as follows:
(1) Children who are alleged to be CHINS under section 31-34-1-6 of the
Indiana Code, 128 colloquially called CHINS 6;
127

128

In 2019, there were 13,610 new CHINS cases, which does not include the already open and pending CHINS
cases; there were 5,700 new TPR cases. 2019 Activities, IND. COURTS,
https://publicaccess.courts.in.gov/ICOR/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). In 2020 thus far, there have been 6,006
new CHINS filings and 2,237 new TPR filings. Id. There is often a waitlist for a GAL or CASA; the number
of new CHINS and TPR filings per year, on top of already pending cases, would pose significant structural
problems to the CHINS and TPR systems, as well as place a significant strain on the existing legal
community.
Indiana Code section 31-34-1-6 provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child turns eighteen years
old, “(1) the child substantially endangers the child's own health or the health of another individual; and (2)
the child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be
provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” IND. CODE § 31-34-1-6 (2020).
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(2) Children who are alleged to be CHINS under section 31-34-1-3.5 of the
Indiana Code, when a child is a victim of human or sexual trafficking; 129
(3) Dual Status children, as defined at section 31-41-1-2 of the Indiana
Code; 130
(4) Children placed in residential treatment facilities; 131
(5) Children whose wishes differ from that of their GAL or CASA and are
aged fourteen or older or are otherwise of sufficient maturity to articulate
their difference in wishes and reasoning behind those wishes;

129

130

Indiana Code section 31-34-1-3.5 provides that a child is a CHINS if, before the child turns eighteen years
old, “(1) the child is the victim of human or sexual trafficking (as defined in IC 31-9-2-133.1); and (2) the
child needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that (A) the child is not receiving; and (B) is unlikely to be
provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.” IND. CODE § 31-34-1-3.5(a) (2020). This
statute also provides that “[a] child is considered a victim of human or sexual trafficking regardless of
whether the child consented to the conduct described in subsection (a)(1).” § 31-34-1-3.5(b).
Indiana Code section 31-41-1-2 provides that a “dual status child” includes:
(1) a child who is alleged to be or is presently adjudicated to be a [CHINS] . . . and is alleged
to be or is presently adjudicated to be a delinquent child . . .;
(2) a child who is currently named in an informal adjustment and who is adjudicated a
delinquent child . . .;
(3) a child who is currently named in an informal adjustment and who is also adjudicated to
be a [CHINS] . . .;
(4) a child who: (A) has been previously adjudicated to be a [CHINS] . . . ; or (B) was a
participant in an informal adjustment, . . . and who was under a wardship that had been
terminated or was in a program of informal adjustment that had concluded before the
current delinquency petition;
(5) a child who: (A) was previously adjudicated to be a delinquent child under . . . [a case]
that was closed; and (B) a participant in a program of informal adjustment . . . which was
concluded prior to a . . . [CHINS] proceeding; and
(6) a child: (A) who is eligible for release from commitment of the department of correction;
(B) and whose parent, guardian, or custodian: (i) cannot be located; or (ii) is unwilling to
take custody of the child; and (C) for whom the department of correction is requesting a
modification of the dispositional decree . . . .

131

IND. CODE § 31-41-1-2(1)–(6) (2020).
Residential treatment facilities are more broadly within the ambit of “[c]hild caring institution[s],” which
are defined at Indiana Code section 31-9-2-16.7 as “residential facilit[ies] that provide childcare on a
twenty-four (24) hour basis for more than ten (10) children; or . . . a residential facility with a capacity of
not more than ten (10) children that does not meet the residential structure requirements of a group home.”
Id. § 31-9-2-16.7. Group homes can also be residential treatment facilities; they are defined at Indiana Code
section 31-9-2-48.5 as “residential structure[s] in which care is provided on a twenty-four (24) hour basis for
not more than ten (10) children.” Id. § 31-9-2-48.5. Residential treatment facilities could even potentially
include therapeutic foster care, defined at Indiana Code section 31-9-2-129.5 as “foster family home[s] . . .
that provide[] care to” children or to eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds in “collaborative care . . . who [have]
serious emotional disturbances, significant behavioral health needs and functional impairments, or
developmental or physical disabilities.” Id. § 31-9-2-129.5. Additionally, it is a home where “the child or
individual receives treatment in a family home through an integrated array of services supervised and
supported by qualified program staff from” various sources. Id. Residential treatment facilities have a
different definition under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC), outlined at Indiana
Code section 31-28-5.8-1.
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(6) Children who are CHINS under section 31-34-1-9 of the Indiana Code,
when a disabled child is deprived of necessary nutrition, medical, or
surgical intervention; 132
(7) Children who themselves are a parent of a child who is the subject of an
ongoing investigation or a CHINS petition;
(8) Children who are placed in non-relative, non-kinship foster care
placements, and who have had three or more non-relative, non-kinship
foster care placements in a period of one year; and
(9) Children whose GAL or CASA, the DCS attorney or case manager, or the
public defender for the parents, guardian, or custodian have requested
counsel, and the court determines, after a hearing, that appointment of
counsel is required.
A. CHINS 6 Proposal
When a child is the subject of a CHINS 6 petition, there is no parent,
guardian, or custodian who is the perpetrator of abuse or neglect against the child;
rather, it is the child themselves who is alleged to be endangering their own health
or the health of another. 133 This places the child in the position of admitting or
denying to the CHINS allegations made against them; 134 if they admit the
allegations, then those allegations are deemed true, and the CHINS case proceeds
forward. 135 If they deny the allegations, the matter proceeds to fact-finding, where
DCS, the child’s parents or guardian, and even the child’s CASA or GAL may all
argue that the allegations are true, while the child may continue to argue they are
not. 136 There are a variety of reasons a child may wish to contest and not admit to
CHINS 6 allegations. The child may be concerned about long-term consequences of
such an adjudication. They may not wish to receive certain services. They may
believe that it is not their own behavior that is placing themselves or others in
danger. They may also believe that their needs stem from other problems in their
personal or family lives that should be addressed.
A CHINS 6 petition very readily pits a child against their own parents,
guardians, DCS, and even the child’s CASA or GAL. All these entities may be
deeply concerned for the child and may wish to act in the child’s best interests, but
it is the child who is essentially considered a perpetrator against themselves or
others. The provision of counsel to the child, to advocate for the child’s wishes, is

132

133
134
135
136

Section 31-34-1-9 clarifies that a child may qualify as a CHINS under the CHINS definitions of abuse and
neglect if the child has a disability and that child is “(1) is deprived of nutrition that is necessary to sustain
life; or (2) is deprived of medical or surgical intervention that is necessary to remedy or ameliorate a lifethreatening medical condition; if the nutrition or medical or surgical intervention is generally provided to
similarly situated children with or without disabilities.” Id. § 31-34-1-9.
Id. § 31-34-1-6.
Id. §§ 31-34-10-6 to -7.
Id. § 31-34-10-8.
Id.
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necessary in order to protect the child’s rights and interests beyond just that of their
best interests.
B. Human Trafficking Proposal
If a CHINS petition is filed alleging that a child is a CHINS because the child
is a victim of human or sex trafficking, then the juvenile court must ascertain if the
child admits or denies the allegations. 137 If the child fails to respond, this
nonresponse constitutes a denial, and the court would proceed to fact-finding. 138
Presumably, requiring the child to admit or deny allegations prevents the child
from being excluded from the CHINS proceedings. 139
Much of the same logic from Part V(A) applies in equal force to children
alleged to be trafficking victims. Both require the child to admit or deny allegations;
both provide a likely scenario where the child’s interests are adverse to the wishes
of DCS and the parents or caregiver, and even stand in opposition to that of the
GAL/CASA’s recommendations for the child; both could have long term impacts on
the child’s life from a decision to admit or deny the allegations; and both situations
are often a strong indicator that there are deeper problems in the child’s life and
home. For these reasons, children alleged to be CHINS under the human and sex
trafficking category should be given a mandatory appointment of counsel.
C. Dual Status Proposal
A dual status child is one who has concurrent state-involved legal
proceedings pending or that were recently closed. 140 Dual status legislation was
enacted in Indiana in 2015 in order to address the social reality of the way trauma
can impact the behavior of children. 141 Children who appear in the juvenile
delinquency system generally do not arrive there wholly unscathed; there are often
concurrent problems in their family lives that give rise to the juvenile delinquency
case. 142 Dual status is meant to allow courts to jointly address both problems—the
delinquent behavior and any other home, personal, or family situations that
contribute to or in some way complicate the child’s behavior and actions.
As a matter of course, a child is appointed an attorney in their juvenile
delinquency case. 143 However, that public defender is not asked to represent the
137
138
139
140
141

142
143

Id. §§ 31-34-10-6 to -7.
Id. § 31-34-10-7.
Id. § 31-34-6-8.
Id. § 31-41-1-2.
See Vincent J. Felitti, Robert F. Anda, Dale Nordenberg, David F. Williamson, Alison M. Spitz, Valerie
Edwards, Mary P. Koss & James S. Marks, Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to
Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 245 (1998).
Indiana Code §§ 31-41-2-2 and -5 lay out a list of factors that a dual assessment team should comprise and
consider; many factors impinge on a child’s current familial situation, best interests, needs, and strengths.
IND. CODE §§ 31-32-2-2, 31-32-4-1.
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child in any concurrent CHINS case, as there is no statute for the mandatory
provision of counsel to children in CHINS cases. Dual status may be granted to a
child to help lessen the confusion between the two cases and status, ease
communication between courts, be better able to provide the child with what the
child actually needs, and secure better outcomes for the child. However, a dual
status child is also placed in a tenuous position—because they do not have counsel
in the CHINS case, they may admit to statements or agree to services that impact
their juvenile delinquency case, while services that may help their juvenile
delinquency case could be detrimental to their emotional health or their physical
safety in the CHINS case. Without the provision of counsel for both cases, 144 the
child risks negatively impacting one or both cases, or more generally, having their
own concerns, goals, and even safety lost in jurisdictional chaos.
D. Children in Residential Treatment Facilities Proposal
When no kinship care or foster home can be identified, children are
frequently placed into residential treatment facilities as a last resort. These
facilities can vary widely, but overall, their structure is often geared towards
treatment and housing, and even group “homes” for older children that are more
regimented and restrictive than foster homes or kinship placements would be. 145
There is also the option for twenty-four hour care or supervision, an option most
often utilized for children who are difficult to place in a foster home or a kinship
placement due to significant emotional disturbances; significant behavioral or
mental health needs; or other functional, developmental, or physical
impairments. 146 Other times, DCS struggles to find foster or kinship homes for
older youth, and they are placed into residential treatment facilities until a less
restrictive option is available.
These are significantly restrictive placement options for a child. They are
very much in the care of and at the mercy of their custodian, DCS, and the facility
that is providing care. The child’s access to family, friends, and other social supports
is severely limited; in turn, the ability of the parents or normal caregivers to access
their child or information about their child in residential treatment is also severely
limited. It is a very literal deprivation of liberty, and a child’s rights and interests
are implicated, especially for youth temporarily placed there for convenience or due
to a lack of availability of less restrictive options.
As is mentioned in a more in-depth discussion below, there is a significant
risk of exposing a child to more trauma when they are removed from their home and
placed in an unfamiliar setting. 147 When considered in addition to whatever trauma
the child has already experienced in their own home that gave rise to the CHINS
144
145
146
147

Ideally, the same public defender appointed to represent the child in their juvenile delinquency case would
be able to represent them in a CHINS case; however, funding and resources are a perpetual concern.
See supra note 131 discussion.
See supra note 131 discussion.
See infra Part V.H.
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allegations, one must proceed cautiously. These circumstances easily lend
themselves to a situation in which the child’s wishes do not align with the other
parties’ positions and perhaps not even with what the GAL or CASA advocates for
as in the child’s best interests.
E. Child’s Wishes Differ from GAL/CASA Proposal
For all the reasons previously discussed in this Article, children in CHINS
cases have significant rights and liberties at risk. When their wishes align with
their best interests, a CASA or GAL can effectively advocate for those wishes
alongside their best interests. However, when those two items are not aligned and
are placed at odds with each other, there is a significant risk of the child’s wishes,
and, by extension, their rights and liberty interests, being ineffectively represented
and less than zealously argued.
There are several steps that must be taken before a provision of counsel can
be implemented in this scenario. First and foremost, it should be a statutory
requirement that a GAL or CASA must report to the court what a child’s expressed
wishes are in all cases, whether or not the child’s wishes align with the GAL/CASA
recommendations.
From there, Indiana must carefully consider when it is appropriate for a
difference of wishes to trigger an appointment of counsel for a child and the
functionality of this trigger. Since a GAL/CASA is likely to know a child’s expressed
wishes and would have a duty to inform the court of those wishes, it would not
overburden the GAL/CASA to require that they also inform the court of any
differences between their own recommendations and a child’s wishes. 148 Second,
appropriate weight should be afforded to the child’s decision based on the child’s
age, as is already the case in Indiana Custody and Parenting Time Guidelines. In
general custody and parenting time law, a child’s wishes may be considered, with
significantly more weight given to those wishes when the child reaches age
fourteen. 149 It would be easy to draw a bright line and to provide that if a child is
age fourteen and older and their wishes differ from the recommendations of their
GAL/CASA, then counsel should be appointed in CHINS cases. Of course, this is
unlikely to capture the entire spectrum of children in need of counsel. However, how
to gauge the extent to which a younger child’s wishes are adequately informed by
what adults would consider to be mature and thoughtful reasoning would open an
entire line of litigation in what is theoretically a mandatory, automatic
appointment. Therefore, this Article will discuss this category of children in a
conditional appointment section below, titled “Other Requests: The Discretionary
Proposal.”
148

149

Although this proposal places the burden on the GAL/CASA to notify a court and therefore trigger the
appointment of counsel, there may be other scenarios in which a parent, foster parent, or even a service
provider is aware of such conflicting wishes. These persons could either inform the court of the conflicting
wishes or could be required to pass that information to the GAL/CASA.
IND. CODE §§ 31-14-13-2, 31-17-2-8 (2020).
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F. Disabled Children Deprived of Necessities Proposal
Indiana Code section 31-34-1-9 was passed by the Indiana legislature in
response to the Baby Doe case. 150 This legislation does not create a separate CHINS
category but, rather, provides that children who fit into one of the other CHINS
categories are not excluded from CHINS status and protections because of their
disability. 151 The statute is not aimed at all disabled children who are denied
nutrition and life-sustaining medical treatment; instead, it provides that a child
who is denied treatment or nutrition is not a CHINS if such nutrition or treatment
is not “generally provided” to similarly situated children. 152
Although this statute was clearly aimed at infants as a result of the Baby
Doe case, the phrase “[c]hild with a disability” applies to all children under the age
of eighteen who have a disability defined by section 22-9-1-3(r). 153 It is certainly
possible to conceive of a situation where a parent’s or other caretaker’s medical
decisions place them at odds with DCS; while the child’s life hangs in balance,
various parties argue over the child’s best interests, with the child having no say in
the nature and quantity of their medical care. Regardless of whether the child’s
wishes align with any party, the child’s literal continuation of life is at issue, and
the appointment of counsel is necessary.
Obviously, there may be children with a disability who, due to the nature of
their disability, are unable to vocalize their wishes; there may also be children with
a disability who are too young to articulate a wish about their medical care. These
factors make drawing a bright line for age or ability difficult. As a starting point,
requiring counsel for children who fit within the ambit of Indiana Code section 3134-1-9, are age fourteen or older, and are able to express their wishes seems
appropriate. Children who fit within the definition of section 31-34-1-9 of the
Indiana Code but are not age fourteen or older and those children who may not be
able to express their wishes should fall within the conditional appointment of
counsel in Part V(I).

150

151
152

153

Baby Doe was born in Monroe County, Indiana in 1982 with Down Syndrome and a life-threatening
physical condition that was correctable by surgery. See Jeff Lyon, The Death of Baby Doe, CHI. TRIB., Feb.
10, 1985, at H10. The type of surgery was generally provided to newborns without disabilities suffering
from the same physical condition. Id. Instead, the parents chose no nutrition and no surgical intervention
for the child. Id. The child died six days after birth. Id.
IND. CODE § 31-34-1-9.
This language does not mean that there is no consideration to the child’s disability that may affect the
child’s life span, risk of surgical complication, and probability of surgical success to such an extent that the
only “similarly situated” children are other children with the same disability. See Abigail Lawlis Kuzma,
The Legislative Response to Infant Doe, 59 IND. L.J. 377 (1984) (Indiana statute allows denial of treatment
to infants who suffer from hopeless conditions). Therefore, medical treatment could theoretically be denied
where it is the general practice to deny treatment to those suffering from the same extreme condition. Id.
IND. CODE §§ 31-9-2-20, 22-9-1-3(r) (providing that “‘[d]isabled’ or ‘disability’ means the physical or mental
condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability”).
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G. Child is a Parent to a Child Who is Also a CHINS
It is not infrequent to see a child with CHINS status who also is or becomes a
parent to another child during the course of their CHINS case. The new infant
frequently becomes a CHINS themselves, resulting in two separate, but inextricably
intertwined, CHINS cases. Even though the needs of each child likely differ, the
results in each case often hinge on each other, and the facts are often extremely
interwoven.
At a bare minimum, counsel for the child-parent should be mandatory
because of the complex interwoven interests of the child-parent, the infant, the
child-parent’s wishes, and the fundamental right the child-parent has to care,
custody, and control of their child. A GAL or CASA is not designed to necessarily
advocate for the child-parent’s rights, though, of course, they may do so; their focus
is on the child-parent’s best interests. An attorney provided to the child-parent will
be able to address the wishes and fundamental rights and zealously advocate for the
child. There are other potential reasons that mandatory counsel for a child-parent is
advisable; these reasons include, but are not limited to, the facts underlying the
pregnancy and birth of the infant, whether abuse or neglect was involved in the
resulting parenthood of the child-parent, and when the child-parent’s wishes with
respect to their own lives and the lives of their infant child are at odds with their
own best interests.
H. Repeated Foster Care Placements Proposal
When children must be removed from their homes and cannot be placed with
relatives or other kinship placements, 154 the next least restrictive step is to place
them in a licensed foster home. 155 It is undoubtedly a difficult decision to determine
that a child must be removed from their home and placed elsewhere, especially
when that elsewhere is a foster home to which the child has no prior attachment or
relationship. On top of the trauma the child has already experienced that resulted
in their removal, they are now placed in an entirely unfamiliar situation at a time
in their lives where they are already in crisis and deep in uncertainty. Entering
foster care, while often a necessity, is a traumatic event in itself and one that arises
to the level of qualifying as an Adverse Childhood Experience (ACE). 156 Foster care
154

155
156

Kinship placement is defined in the DCS Policy Manual as a permissible placement with a person “who is
not related by blood, marriage, or adoption if this is an individual with whom the child has an established
and significant relationship.” IND. DEP’T OF CHILD SERVS. CHILD WELFARE POLICY, Ch. 16, § 2 at 4 (2020),
https://www.in.gov/dcs/files/Child_Welfare_Policy_Manual.pdf. It should “[h]ave the characteristics of a
familial relationship,” have existed before DCS’s involvement, and have the ability to be verified. Id.
See supra note 131 discussion.
See Rebecca Rebbe, Paula S. Nurius, Mark E. Courtney & Kym R. Ahrens, Adverse Childhood Experiences
and Young Adult Health Outcomes Among Youth Aging Out of Foster Care, 18 ACAD. PEDIATRICS 502, 502–
03 (2018); Delilah Bruskas & Dale H. Tessin, Adverse Childhood Experiences and Psychosocial Well-Being
of Women Who Were in Foster Care as Children, 17 PERMANENTE J. 131, 131–32 (2013). The Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention defines an ACE as traumatic events experienced in childhood that are
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placements may need to be changed for any number of reasons, and each change in
a foster care placement imparts yet more trauma to the child and increases their
ACE score. 157 There is a temptation to think that if foster care is necessary, then it
is safe and healthy for a child to be moved around when it seems appropriate, no
matter how many placements they may need to experience. However, the research
clearly belies that belief.
This trauma from multiple foster care placements affects children of all ages.
No matter how caring and excellent the foster families are, it is unhealthy for
children to have multiple foster care placements. While it may be within their
general best interests to be moved from one placement into another, and while it
may be necessary in some cases, it is likely indicative of a larger problem. Problems
may be small-scale and limited to the case itself, or they may be systemic, social
problems spread across the state. Whatever the case, if a child has had multiple
foster care placements within a certain period of time, it is a clear indicator that a
child’s interests and rights are not being properly attended to, perhaps even despite
the best efforts of the child’s GAL/CASA. In this scenario, there should be an
automatic appointment of counsel for a child.
I. Other Requests—The Discretionary Proposal
There is simply no way to preemptively imagine, define, and codify every
situation that should trigger a mandatory appointment of counsel. Conversely, an
across-the-board, mandatory appointment of counsel for children in CHINS cases is
a blunt force tool that expends resources Indiana does not possess, and in some
cases, is utterly ineffective.
While the other categories for the provision of counsel for children above are
mandatory, this category is discretionary and would be designed to be more flexible
to allow for the myriad of ways in which a case may play out indicating the need for
the appointment of counsel for a child. This category would provide that when the
child; the child’s GAL/CASA; DCS; or the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child
requests counsel, then the court must have a hearing and make findings as to
whether or not the appointment of counsel is warranted.
Some factors a court could consider in deciding whether to appoint counsel for
a child:
(1) Whether the child’s wishes differ from the GAL/CASA recommendations
and whether the child is under the age of fourteen;
(2) How many out-of-home placements, including relative, kinship, and foster
care placements, a child has experienced during the pendency of the case;
(3) The nature and severity of the allegations in the CHINS petition;

157

linked to “chronic health problems, mental illness, and substance abuse,” along with other negative
outcomes in adulthood. See Violence Prevention, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 3, 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/aces/fastfact.html?CDC_AA_r.
Rebbe et al., supra note 156; Bruskas & Tessin, supra note 156; Violence Prevention, supra note 156.
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(4) Whether the child has unique or unmet needs that are not being addressed
or are not being adequately addressed;
(5) Whether there is a pending adult criminal case associated with the
allegations in the CHINS petition;
(6) How many times the child has been the subject of a substantiated report of
abuse or neglect, an informal adjustment, or a CHINS petition;
(7) Whether the child falls within Indiana Code section 31-34-1-9 and is either
under the age of fourteen, there is uncertainty as to the ability of the child
to express their wishes, or the child’s best interests and rights are not being
adequately advocated for;
(8) How long a case has been pending;
(9) Whether the child, as a result of the CHINS proceeding, has been separated
from siblings or half-siblings with whom the child has a close and important
relationship;
(10) Whether there are concerns that the child may need the protection of
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality;
(11) Whether there are conflicts of interest that prevent a GAL/CASA program
from advocating for the child, and the conflict cannot be addressed through
mitigation or appointment of another GAL/CASA; and
(12) Other factors indicating that the protection of the child’s rights and
interests require the appointment of counsel.
The court should not be limited to these factors, but they can act as a guide.
Furthermore, the standard for determining whether a child’s needs counsel under
the discretion statute should be that the preponderance of the evidence indicates
the child’s best interests require the appointment of counsel.
J. Statutory Alterations and Considerations
Proposed statutory alterations are as follows:
Statute regarding GAL/CASA duties. There should be a statute that
explicitly requires the GAL or CASA (or both) to report to the court any and all of
the child’s expressed wishes. The statute should provide that when those expressed
wishes conflict with the GAL/CASA’s recommendations, the GAL/CASA should
notify the court in writing of those wishes within a certain period of time. This
notification process may trigger appointment of counsel for the child if other
appropriate circumstances exist and could be addressed in a formulaic manner by
requiring the GAL or CASA to complete a notification form to the court and parties
when such a circumstance exists.
Statutes regarding the mandatory appointment of counsel for children. There
should be a single statute that outlines the circumstances in which there is a
mandatory appointment of counsel for children. This mandatory appointment of
counsel can have an “opt-out” provision. For example, the statute could be
structured as follows:
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(A) Client-directed counsel for a child must be appointed in the following
circumstances:
(1) The child is alleged to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-341-2;
(2) The child is alleged to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-341-3.5;
(3) The child is alleged to be a CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-341-6;
(4) The child has been placed in a residential treatment facility;
(5) The child:
a. Is age fourteen or older; and
b. Has expressed wishes differ from the recommendations of the
child’s GAL, CASA, or both;
(6) The child:
a. Meets the definition of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-9 as a
disabled child being deprived of necessary nutrition, medical, or
surgical intervention;
b. Is at least fourteen years old; and
c. Is able to sufficiently communicate their wishes;
(7) The child:
a. Is themselves the parent of a minor child; and
b. Is also the subject of a pending CHINS or Informal Adjustment
proceeding; and
(8) The child:
a. Is currently placed in nonrelative, non-kinship foster care; and
b. Has experienced at least three or more nonrelative, non-kinship
foster care placements in the period of one year, which includes
the current placement.
(B) The requirement for the mandatory appointment of counsel for a child
described in section (A) may be vacated if the child, the child’s GAL/CASA,
the Department, or the parents, file a request with the court to dismiss
the mandatory appointment of counsel for the child and serve notice of
this request upon all persons named in this subsection.
(C) Upon receiving a request described in subsection (B), a court may dismiss
the mandatory appointment of counsel for a child after notice and a
hearing if:
(1) All parties named in subsection (B) were given notice and an
opportunity to respond;
(2) A hearing was held on the matter of dismissal of the mandatory
appointment of counsel for the child;
(3) The court finds that counsel for the child is not required; and
(4) The court finds that the child’s interests and wishes are adequately
represented without counsel.
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(D) If a mandatory appointment of counsel for a child has been dismissed
pursuant to subsection (C), any party to the CHINS proceeding may file a
renewed request for mandatory appointment of counsel for the child. Any
renewed request must note the change in circumstances from the court
order dismissing the mandatory appointment of counsel.
There should be a single statute outlining the discretionary appointment of
counsel. The statute could be structured as follows:
(A) A juvenile court may, at any point, appoint counsel for a child.
(B) If the child, the child’s GAL/CASA, the Department, or a parent,
guardian, or custodian request that the court order discretionary counsel
to be appointed for the child, the court must:
(1) Set the matter for hearing;
(2) Ensure the parties have notice and an opportunity to present evidence;
and
(3) Issue findings on its determination on whether to appoint
discretionary counsel for the child.
(C) Factors that a court may consider, but is not limited to considering, when
issuing a decision on whether or not to appoint discretionary counsel for a
child in CHINS proceeding include:
(1) The number of home placements, including relative, kinship, and
foster care placements, a child has experienced during the pendency of
the case;
(2) The nature and severity of the allegations in the CHINS petition;
(3) Whether the child has unique or unmet needs that are not being
addressed or are not being adequately addressed;
(4) If the child is younger than age fourteen, and the child’s wishes differ
from the GAL/CASA recommendations;
(5) If the child meets the definition of a disabled child deprived of certain
necessities at Indiana Code section 31-34-1-9, and
a. The child is younger than age fourteen;
b. There is unclear ability of the child to express their own wishes;
or
c. There is insufficient advocacy being given to the child’s rights
and interests.
(6) Whether there is a pending adult criminal case associated with the
allegations in the CHINS petition;
(7) How many times the child has been the subject of a substantiated
report of abuse or neglect, an informal adjustment, or a CHINS
petition;
(8) How long the CHINS case has been pending;
(9) Whether the child, as a result of the CHINS proceeding, has been
separated from siblings or half-siblings with whom the child has a
close and important relationship;
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(10) Whether there are concerns that the child may need the protection of
attorney-client privilege and confidentiality;
(11) Whether there are conflicts of interest that prevent a GAL/CASA
program from advocating for the child and the conflict cannot be
address through mitigation or appointment of another GAL/CASA;
(12) Other factors indicating that the protection of the child’s rights and
interests require the appointment of counsel.
CONCLUSION
The current structure of Indiana law regarding the protection of children’s
legal interests in CHINS cases makes Indiana “low-hanging fruit” for lawsuits
pursuing a right to counsel for children in dependency proceedings. Indiana is in the
minority of states that do not provide any kind of mandated right to counsel for
children that is beyond a vague discretionary right, and, as such, has become an
easy target for organizations seeking to expand children’s right to counsel in
dependency proceedings across the country. While it is not practical or necessary for
Indiana to enact a blanket mandatory right to counsel for children in CHINS cases,
there are circumstances that could address major due process and liberty interest
concerns, while also relying heavily on the already existing robust GAL/CASA
organizations and structure available to us. Even though the aforementioned
suggestions seem numerous, the vast majority of cases in CHINS proceedings will
likely continue to be served by GAL/CASA organizations, and the number of cases
that fit into these suggested, delineated, mandatory appointments of client-directed
counsel will likely be far fewer in number. This proposal will make the provision of
a client-directed attorney for children more manageable while still offering critical
legal protections in key case types, thereby striking an Indiana-specific balance
between protecting the fundamental rights of Indiana’s children, while also relying
on existing infrastructure.

